23 February 2007

Thoughts on the (nonexistence of) the Soul

I’ve written a good bit on this blog about Christian resistance to the idea that all life, including humans, came to be in a naturalistic, gradual way over millions of years through evolution. I’ve written about it because there’s a lot of public and private discussion on the matter, so it’s relevant.

But evolution is a very easy conversation to have when compared to another that I think eventually must also talk place if we are ever to be fully intellectually honest about our theological positions. I’m talking here about the nature of Being in a metaphysical sense. I’m talking about the scientific status of the soul. The question is quite central for me since I’m a cognitive scientist – I study the mind and there isn’t any clear way in which the mind and the soul can be considered to be different things. In fact, I don’t think there can be a difference on any grounds other than the purely imaginative.

It’s easy to see why this is the case. Just ask the age-old question: what is the soul? How do you answer it? You surely cannot say “The soul is who I am” since it is quite easy to change who you are. Say I hit your right frontal lobe with a hammer. Say you survive the incident, but you have changed. You no longer find things funny, say. Or perhaps you can no longer solve simple problems like tying your shoes or turning off a faucet. Who you are has changed at a very essential level. Has your soul changed, too? Or think about people with severe autism. All evidence suggests that such people do not have a “mental life” in the same way that normal people do. It isn’t clear they even think of themselves as people or have a notion of what it means to be a person. Do they have souls? Or what about the living but brain dead, kept alive on life support. Do they have souls? If they do, then what do we say about them? Perhaps they have souls but just can’t “get in touch” with them? If that’s the case, then do we need to posit a mind~soul connection that gets disrupted when our minds are damaged or unconscious? If they don’t, they the question of what the soul is really comes into focus. It seems we have to say that, if we have souls, we cannot detect or experience them. In that case, why say we have them at all?

You see what trouble we get into here very quickly. There doesn’t seem to be any sense in which humans can be said to have a soul (or spirit or whatever the term) apart from their minds.

Less than a hundred years ago we might have been comfortable with that conclusion. But now we know that the mind, like everything else in the world, is a manifestation of matter (namely, brain matter). We can study the mind like we study the universe, and one day we hope to actually understand exactly how it is that the grey matter in our heads gives rise to the mental world we experience (though we are far, far away from that goal and it isn’t clear we’ll ever reach it). There seems to be no room here for a soul, no possible hypothesis that makes any sense at all. And even if we were to conclude that the mind is the soul, we would still have a serious theological issue. For if we accept the view that the soul leaves the body when we die and goes somewhere (heaven or hell or the hallway closet), we have to explain how the set of characteristics that constitute our mental state could exist outside of the grey matter that gave rise to it. Don’t let talk about information theory and artificial intelligence fool you: there is no comfort there. If you are your mind (and you are), then you are also inextricably your body as well. All of cognitive science points to the fact that minds are very particularly human things that result from particularly human brains. It all points to this: outside of your body, you do not exist.

From a traditional religious standpoint, we are left here with a pretty bleak view: the conclusion that (1) the soul or spirit does not exist in any definable way, and (2) if we define the soul as existing in the mind (the only possible choice), the soul cannot exist apart from the body. The theological implications are pretty clear to me: when we die, we are dead. We don’t “go” anywhere. We don’t continue to exist once our brains stop functioning. We just die.

This is a devastating conclusion to reach. It isn’t any wonder we are more than willing to forego applying natural science to the mind, to maintain as much mystery there as possible. We don’t want to face the fact that we are mortal in a final, definitive sense. I suspect this is behind much of the methodological dualism that plagues cognitive sciences from vision to linguistics.

But here is what is amazing: as soon as the scientist in me reaches the point of despair at the conclusions he has reached, the Christian in me grasps onto hope. For the when it comes to life after death, the central teaching of the Bible is not that we go to heaven when we die. In fact, it is difficult to find solid theological ground for this position in the scriptures anywhere. What IS central is the hope of resurrection, something the Bible clearly describes as a physical, bodily raising from the dead. When Christ returns, we learn, our actual, physical bodies will be brought forth from the ground and transformed in a physical way into everlasting bodies and we will live again, forever.

What more affirming position could we arrive at? Just as we learn from science that we cannot exist apart from our bodies, we learn from scripture that we do not have to. God fully intends to restore our bodies after our deaths when his Kingdom comes fully to the earth. And then we will exist again, and forever, with him.

In the end, then, I think the Christian position is an incredibly hopeful one. But you can probably imagine how difficult it would be to get Christians thinking along these lines. That's because we are so incredibly resistant to the idea of our own mortality, a fact that makes a great deal of sense biologically. But I do think we if want a theology that is intellectually honest with regard to scientific inquiry, a position like this one is the only sensible one to have.

9 Comments:

At 12:52 AM, Anonymous Anonymous said...

I'm not sure this is as difficult a topic as you think it is, unless one is really trapped within the Cartesian duality of positing thinking with being... which come to think of it, is really just dressed up Gnosticism (which returns in history as Platonism, Manichaeanism and a host of other heresies).

-Mike

 
At 5:41 AM, Blogger Lame and Blind said...

If thinking is not being, then I do not know what being is (in the relevant sense, of course). If you can think of a way to define the soul that does not equate it with (some aspect of) the mind, please share.

Cartesian duality is a more scientific position than you may think it is. Essentially, Descartes and his followers argued that since thinking (actually, they were talking about language specifically) cannot be said to have a physical cause, it therefore could not be explained by the mechanistic view of the world (which was the only way of understanding science had provided at the time). They were right. They very logically concluded that mind must be of an essentially different substance than the body (which was subject, they thought, to the laws of mechanics). That situation hasn't changed much today. We still treat mind as an essentially different substance from matter and we have no way to unite the two (and in fact, it is not the theory of mind that is lacking, but the theory of matter, which has become abstract and mysterious since Descartes' time thanks to Newton).

However, the relevant issue here is not so much that we treat the mind-body problem as a two substance problem (which we must do at this point), but rather our beliefs about the connection between the two. Although we have no idea how mind and matter can be unified, we do know that they are inextricably connected. To suppose that the personality (in any way that is defined) can exist outside the body really IS Cartesian dualism in the worst sense.

 
At 6:19 PM, Blogger Josh said...

If we can see electrons and nano particles, why can't we see the soul?

Is anyone looking for the soul? How did we find electrons? Was anyone looking for those at the time? (I'm only a biologist).

 
At 8:15 PM, Blogger Lame and Blind said...

When it comes to subatomic particles, we can't really "see" them, just detect them. Most were not discovered by accident - physicists went looking for them guided by theories which predicted their existence.

But to answer your question, before we could "look" for the soul, we'd have to define it. One thing I've tried to argue here is that we don't have any good definition, Biblical or otherwise, to start with. We just think "my soul is who I am."

But let's think: what if we did go looking for the soul, based on some theory (such things have been tried in the past). What if we found it? What would that show? Only that the soul is a part of the body, right?

 
At 7:34 PM, Blogger Robert said...

A lot of thoughts, but not much time. While I'm sympathetic to your thesis, I think you dismiss information theory too blithely. Core to the biblical narrative is that God redeems his fallen creation, rather than destroy it completely and create something else. There is a continuity between the people of this present age and the people of the age to come. The people of the age to come are the people of this present age, made new.

One could, contrariwise, imagine an eschatological narrative in which God utterly destroys creation, and then makes a perfect creation, whose inhabitants have memories of existing in a previous fallen age, memories that are entirely fictitious. Obviously, this is inconsistent with the character of the God of the Bible. From a purely material standpoint, such an age to come might be indistinguishable from the age to come of revelation, but beyond that material standpoint, history matters, if God even if to no one else.

So there is a continuity between the mortal material body and the material body of the resurrection. But it is not a material continuity: to insist otherwise is to become a wag in the tradition of the Sadducees, who would ask, A particular unit of matter was part of Abraham's body when he died, and later became part of a worm. Later, it became part of Moses' body, and remained so until he died, but at length, it again became part of a worm. And so on, though many generations of righteous men, until at the day of the resurrection, it is once again part of worm. On that day, to whose body will it belong?

I must look beyond the material to find the continuity between the body of this age and that of the age to come. From the moment of death, this entropic world forgets what I was and how I was constituted. But God remembers, such that on that day he can build me anew. Surely that is some persistent, immaterial representation of information, that is me, somehow persisting in the mind of God?

 
At 8:47 PM, Blogger Lame and Blind said...

Hi Robert. Thanks for visiting my blog.

I have two reservations about the information theory way of thinking about the problem. The weaker one has to do with the idea that whatever complex algorithms consitute who I am could be implemented in any kind of matter other than my particular brain and that I would still be me. Perhaps, we can imagine, God could overcome this obstacle by recreating me as a precise replica of my original self down to the molecular level.

But my stronger protest is more theological, for I don't really know what resurrection is in its Biblical context if it is not physical resurrection of our actual bodies. Jesus' actual body was resurrected. He showed his scars to his disciples. And the promise is that one day we will be like him, resurrected and then transformed as he was.

So I think resurrection is material continuity, and I think that's the Biblical view.
Thanks again for the comments.

 
At 1:11 PM, Blogger Robert said...

Hi Brent.

Do I understand you correctly if I understand you to suggest that (1) human brains do things that no computational algorithm could do, but (2) this capability emerges from the brain's material structure?

 
At 3:20 PM, Blogger Lame and Blind said...

I suppose I could be understood to suggest those things. I think (1) is certainly a possibility and has been suggested by some (Roger Penrose, e.g.), but I think we must take a version of (2) to be correct: that whatever the brain does, it cannot be divorced from the fact that the brain is composed of certain materials in a certain organizational structure. Even if everything the brain does is computational (not a given, in my opinion), this doesn't mean that the way the brain computes is the same way a computer would compute.

 
At 4:32 PM, Blogger Robert said...

I agree that some form of (2) is a given. What the brain is certainly defines what it does. But I think it is quite a leap from there to the stronger, converse statement, what the brain does defines what it is.

This goes especially so if what the brain does is computational, because if there is a central dogma in computer science, it is that everything that is computable can be computed by a sufficiently general computer, provided it has sufficient memory and time.

 

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